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RES JUDICATA IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
FINALITY of administrative determinations when tested on judicial review
has received an abundance of scholarly attention.1 But the numerous problems
of administrative res judicata, relating to the conclusiveness of executive
action in subsequent judicial or administrative proceedings other than direct
review, have had little systematic exploration. Such inquiry is made difficult
by the fact that direct judicial review of administrative action developed
through techniques of collateral attack,2 with the result that there has been
a considerable blurring of the distinctions between the two methods of review.8
1. For a collection of references, see Abel, Credit Given Administrative Determita-
tions (1937) 22 IowA L. REV. 461, 517.
2. See Dickinson, Judicial Control of Official Discretion (1928) 22 Am. POL. Scl.
R. 275; Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers (1937) 21 MINN. L. REV. 263.
3. An injunction proceeding may be treated as falling within either category. Com-
pare State ex rel. Sorenson v. Knudtsen, 121 Neb. 270, 236 N. W. 696 (1931) with Shields
v. Utah I. C. R. R., 305 U. S. 177 (1938).
RES JUDICATA
Consequently, the only criterion of differentiation- necessarily an unsatis-
factory one -is to regard as involving a res judicata problem those instances
of review which courts treat as collateral.
Case results in res judicata situations can scarcely be explained by refer-
ence to underlying statutes. Often, it is true, a statutory provision of finality
has been used as grounds for holding an administrative determination immune
from review by the body which made it,4 or from collateral attack. But, vwith
comparable frequency, identical results have been reached in the absence of
such provision,0 and instances may even be found in which a determination
has been treated as open to correction despite a legislative stipulation that it
be final.7 In the great majority of cases,8 legislators have given no considera-
tion to the problem of the extent to which an administrative agency may
control its own orders and determinations.0 And even where a legislative
intention has been indicated, courts have accorded it far from scrupulous
observance.' 0
The judicial maxims on which the general principle of res judicata is based
- "Interest reipublicae itt sit finis lithim!"' and "Neino debet bis vexari pro
eadem causd"1 2 - express equally well the principal notions of ex'pediency
which are most frequently advanced as militating for a principle of administra-
tive res judicata.13 Opposing considerations chiefly include the desirability
4. Conley v. Upson Co., 197 App. Div. 815, 189 N. Y. Supp. 473 (3d Dep't 1921);
Ford Motor Co. v. State, 178 Okla. 193, 62 P. (2d) 48 (1936).
5. Harrington v. Glidden, 179 Mass. 486, 61 N. E. 54 (1901).
6. Wright v. Edwards Hotel & C. Ry., 101 Miss. 470, 58 So. 332 (1912); Chapel
v. Franklin County, 58 Neb. 544, 78 N. W. 1062 (1899).
7. Beckman v. J. WV. Oelerich & Sons, 174 App. Div. 353, 160 N. Y. Supp. 791 (3d
Dep't 1916).
8. Workmen's compensation statutes are a conspicuous exception. See notes 71-92
inlra, and accompanying text.
9. See, however, the provisions of the federal income tax statutes for successive
deficiency assessments, cited infra note 125, and 49 STAT. 457 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 160(d)
(Supp. 1939) and 52 STAT. 112 (1938), 15 U. S. C. § 45(b) (Supp. 1939) giving the
N. L. R. B. and the F. C. C. extensive powers of control over their orders.
10. See notes 74-92 and 115-120 infra, and accompanying te.\t
11. "It is a public concern that there be an end to litigation:' Cases in which this
doctrine has been applied to administrative determinations include Hayden v. R. Wallace
& Sons Mfg. Co., 100 Conn. 180, 123 Atl. 9 (1923); Happy Coal Co. v. Hartburger, 251
Ky. 779, 65 S. V. (2d) 977 (1934).
12. "No one ought to be twice vexed for the same cause." For application of this
principle to administrative law situations, see Derrick v. Gaston School Dist., 172 S. C.
472, 174 S. E. 431 (1934) ; State ex re. Schuster Realty Co. v. Lyons, 184 Wisc. 175,
197 N. XV. 585 (1924).
13. It is also argued that an administrative determination which will give rise to
vested interests should not be disturbed, People ex re. Chase v. NVemple, 144 N. Y. 478,
39 N. E. 397 (1895), and that individuals are entitled, to have their rights and liabilities
settled by a single decision on which reliance may be placed. Rothschild & Co v. Mar-
shall, 44 F. (2d) 546 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930).
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of accurate and thoroughgoing statutory enforcement 1 4 and the injustice of
permitting rights and obligations to be perverted by erroneous administrative
action.1 5
The general problem of conclusiveness falls into three rather clearly defined
major subdivisions: (1) the power of an administrative officer or tribunal
to change a possibly erroneous prior determination in further dealings with
the same cause of action or controversy; (2) the effect of such administrative
determinations in subsequent judicial proceedings relating to the same con-
troversy or relief, i.e., a judicial collateral attack; (3) their effect on a later
judicial or administrative decision of a wholly independent controversy. Any
consideration of the conclusiveness of administrative action must also include
the independent, but closely related, question of the effect of administrative
regulations or rulings (especially when retroactive alterations are sought to
be made), and the more general question of whether an estoppel may arise
from the acts of a government officer.
The three major issues outlined above are, from the standpoint of strict
doctrine, actually one. Logically, a valid determination would be res judicata
in all three situations, or in none. This orthodox channel of argument has
often been followed by the courts.' 6 Yet, not infrequently, courts have denied
the existence of this doctrinal connection' 7 holding, for example, that a
workman's compensation award was conclusive in a collateral attack or in
an independent proceeding although still subject to alteration by the tribunal
which made it.' s Again, determinations of the Patent Office have been binding
within the office, but not in the courts.' 9 A brief survey of the doctrines,
general rules and significant factors associated with each of these principal
situations will serve as introduction to the more detailed consideration of
res judicata in each of several types of administrative agencies.
Collateral Attack. Fundamental to collateral attack is the doctrine that
administrative action can always be defeated if such action is totally void
for having been undertaken without jurisdiction.2 0 This, of course, merely
14. F. C. C. v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 437 (U. S. 1940); Fair v.
Hartford Rubber Works, 95 Conn. 350, 111 At. 193 (1920).
15. Industrial Comm. v. Dell, 104 Ohio St. 389, 135 N. E. 669 (1922).
16. Sudbury v. Board of Comm'rs, 157 Ind. 446, 62 N. E. 45 (1901); Industrial
Comm. v. Davis, 126 Ohio St. 593, 186 N. E. 505 (1933).
17. Stratton v. Railroad Comm., 186 Calif. 119, 198 Pac. 1051 (1921).
18. Biederzycki v. Farrel Foundry & Mach. Co., 103 Conn. 701, 131 Atl. 739 (1926);
Slattery v. Board of Est. & Apport., 271 N. Y. 346, 3 N. E. (2d) 505 (1936).
19. A decision in an interference is res judicata, as to all issues which could have
been raised, in a subsequent interference [New Depart. Mfg. Co. v. Robinson, 39 App.
D. C. 504 (1912)] and on a subsequent application [In re Marconi, 38 App. D. C. 286
(1912)]. An inventor has no right to a second application where a first has been dis-
missed. In re Barratt's Appeal, 14 App. D. C. 255 (1899). See Comment (1938) 6 Gto.
WASH. L. REv. 364. But Patent Office determinations are not conclusive in infringe-
ment actions, even if affirmed by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. Morrell
& Co. v. Doyle, 97 F. (2d) 232 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938).
20. Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 N. E. 100 (1891).
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raises the thorny question of what facts are jurisdictional, the answers to
which reveal little unanimity.21 Where jurisdiction has been conceded, there
has been even greater diversity as to the protection to be given to the admin-
istrative action. Various courts have regarded such action as conclusive, as
prima facie correct, or as completely without persuasive effect.--- Some cases
have gone so far as to accord administrative decisions all the presumptions
of jurisdictional validity attaching to judgments of record.2
Determinations which are deemed conclusive have been customarily labeled
judicial or quasi-judicial in nature,2-4 while those susceptible of collateral
attack have been characterized variously as legislative, executive, administra-
tive or ministerial.25 The doctrinal lines have not been strictly drawn, how-
ever, for even such concededly legislative activities as rate making, and such
ministerial activities as the levy of assessments, have been said to be res
judicata when questioned collaterally.20 And, of course, the contents of
concepts such as "quasi-judicial" and "administrative" are far from clear.*
Instances may be found in which administrative action taken without notice
and hearing have been held immune from collateral attack.2 But the pre-
vailing rule is that in the absence of these elements of due process, collateral
review will be available.29 A more accurate criterion for immunity, however,
is the availability of direct review.30 State tax assessments, for example,
although ordinarily made ex parte, have commonly been held binding in col-
21. Compare London Guar. & Acc. Co. v. Sterling, 233 Mass. 485, 124 X. E. 2S5
(1919) with Thaxter v. Finn, 178 Calif. 270, 173 Pac. 163 (1918). Cf. dissent in Cro-
well v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 65, 73 (1932).
22. Thomas v. Churchill, 84 Me. 446, 24 At. 899 (1S92) (conclusive); Imperial
Brass Mfg. Co. v. Hockmey, 75 F. (2d) 689 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935) (prima face correct);
Sears v. Stone County, 105 Mo. 236, 16 S. W. 878 (1891) (witlout effect).
23. Chicago & A- Ry. v. Sutton, 130 Ind. 405, 30 N. E. 291 (1892). The presumption
of jurisdictional validity may be held conclusive. People v. Los Angeles, 133 Cal. 333,
65 Pac. 749 (1901).
24. Colusa County v. Dejarnett, 55 Cal. 373 (180) ; Longinette v. Shelton, 52 S. W.
1078 (Tenn. 1898).
25. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 210 (1903) (legislative); Board of
County Comm'rs v. Cypert, 65 Okla. 168, 166 Pac. 195 (1917) (esecutive); Board of
Comm'rs v. Trautman, 204 Ind. 362, 184 N. E. 178 (1933) (administrative or ministe-
rial).
26. Southern I. Ry. v. Railroad Comm., 172 Ind. 113, 87 N. E. 96 (1909) (rate
making) ; Langhout v. First Nat Bank, 191 Iowa 957, 183 N. . 505 (1921) (assess-
ments ).
27. See Brown, Admdnistratie Commissions and the Judicial Power (1935) 19
MINN. L. REv. 261, 275.
28. Kennedy v. Gibson, 8 Wall. 498 (U. S. 1869) ; State ex rel. Topping v. Houston,
94 Neb. 445, 143 N. IV. 796 (1913).
29. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co. v. M'urray, 105 F. (2d) 212 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939);
City of W. Univ. Place v. State ex rel. Kirby, 56 S. W. (2d) 1031 (Te.-. Civ. App. 1933).
30. Cf. Vright v. Edwards Hotel & C. Ry., 101 Miss. 470, 58 So. 332 (1912) ; Chain-
plin v. Tax Comm., 163 Okla. 185, 20 P. (2d) 904 (1933).
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lateral proceedings because a technique of review is provided.8' On the other
hand, a formal determination of the Interstate Commerce Commission made
after a hearing, for which no statutory method of review is provided, may be
attacked in an independent suit in equity.
32
Administrative Control of Determinations. The characterization of a de-
termination as quasi-judicial has been almost universally regarded as sufficient
ground for holding that the body which made the determination has no
power to change it in the future.83 But in thus extending the doctrine of
res judicata to administrative decisions, the courts have expressly or tacitly
denied the applicability of the companion judicial rule that a court has control
over its adjudications at least during the term at which they were rendered.Y4
Possibly the difficulty of ascertaining "length of term" or an administrative
equivalent has led to this result.35 A more probable reason for this denial
of power to control is the prevailing and apparently universal judicial disin-
clination toward allowing an administrative tribunal to exercise its discretion
or judgment more than once on the same matters.3 0
Action denominated administrative may be regarded as per se subject to
reversal;37 or its reviewability may be treated as a question of statutory
interpretation. But since all administrative action must be grounded in
statutory authority, it is easier to say that without a statutory provision,
there is no power of reversal 38 than it is to say that in the absence of statutory
prohibition, the power to reverse should not be denied. 9 Another ground for
31. Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Dist., 262 U. S. 710 (1922); Huntsville v. Gooden-
rath, 13 Ala. App. 579, 68 So. 676 (1915).
32. Shields v. Utah I. C. R. R., 305 U. S. 177 (1938); cf. Farmers State Bank v.
Bowie County, 95 S. W. (2d) 1304 (Tex. Comm. App. 1936).
33. Lilienthal v. Wyandotte, 286 Mich. 604, 282 N. W. 837 (1938) ; Shugg v. Ana-
conda Copper Mining Co., 100 Mont. 159, 46 P. (2d) 435 (1935).
34. Kalinick v. Collins Co., 116 Conn. 1, 163 At. 460 (1932). Contra: Holmberg
v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. R. R., 115 Neb. 727, 214 N. W. 746 (1927). In Equitable
Trust Co. v. Hamilton, 226 N. Y. 241, 123 N. E. 380 (1919) an order was held revocable
until expiration of Board members' term of office. It is generally held, however, that
changes in incumbents do not affect res judicata rules. Happy Coal Co. v. Hartburger,
251 Ky. 779, 65 S. W. (2d) 975 (1934).
35. But in workmen's compensation cases, the duration of the periodically-paid award
would be a natural and easily administered period. Yet courts have never in the absence
of specific statutory provision allowed industrial accident tribunals such control. See notes
74-87 infra, and accompanying text.
36. Early statements of this attitude may be found in United States v. Bank of Me-
tropolis, 15 Pet. 377, 400 (U. S. 1841); United States v. Burchard, 125 U. S. 176, 180
(1888).
37. People v. McClellan, 118 App. Div. 177, 103 N. Y. Supp. 146 (1st Dep't 1907),
aff'd, 188 N. Y. 618, 81 N. E. 1171 (1908).
38. Conners' Case, 121 Me. 37, 115 At. 520 (1921); Hyland v. Waldo, 158 App. Div.
654, 143 N. Y. Supp. 901 (1st Dep't 1913).




the rule against subsequent reversal employs the functus officio concept: the
officer's authority is exhausted by its initial exercise.40
There appear to be two rough functional generalizations relative to the
power of reversal. In the first place, determinations of the existence of a fact
or status with respect to a present or past group of facts will not be subject
to later alteration. Thus the decision of a city council in an election contest,
the denial of a license, a dismissal or refusal to dismiss by a board or officer
have all been held to preclude the tribunal in question from later changing
its position.41 An administrative agency is at complete liberty, on the other
hand, to change prospectively any regulation*- or rate43 which it has estab-
lished.
In the second place, even a determination described above as having con-
clusive effect will not have such effect when there is, in view of the subject
matter in question, a general likelihood that a subsequent determination of
the same matter will bring to the attention of the tribunal new evidence
or new considerations which could not reasonably have been presented sooner.
The decision on a patent application or interference,"4 for example, is res
judicata within the office because it is probable that all arguments and proofs
on the issue of priority can and will be offered at the first opportunity. On
the other hand, determinations by immigration inspectors of an individual's
right to enter the country, based necessarily on a summary and superficial
investigation, are not conclusive,45 although a similar determination by a
United States Commissioner on full hearing was held conclusive.40 In work-
men's compensation proceedings, findings as to the duration and seriousness
of incapacity are subject to modification,47 but questions of scope of employ-
ment and compensability of injury are not.48 This is true even though the
40. See dissent in Austin Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 35 F. (2d) 910, 913 (C. C. A.
6th, 1929). Contra: In re Smiling, 193 N. C. 448, 137 S. E. 319 (19V7).
41. Muncy v. Hughes, 265 Ky. 588, 97 S. V. (2d) 546 (1936) (election contest).
See cases cited infra in notes 139, 140 (licenses) and 154 (dismissals).
42. Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106 (1904); People ex rcl. X. Y. Fire
Ins. Exch. v. Phillips, 203 App. Div. 13, 196 N. Y. Supp. 202 (3d Dep't 1922); ef. Hel-
vering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 18 (U. S. 1939).
43. Such freedom is commonly provided for by statute. Puget Sound Elect. Ry. v.
Lee, 207 Fed. 860 (IV. D. Wash. 1913) ; Mathieson Alkali Works v. Norfolk & W. Ry.,
147 Va. 426, 137 S. E. 608 (1927).
44. See cases cited note 19 supra.
45. Pearson v. Williams, 202 U. S. 281 (1906). But, according to statute, a deter-
mination against the right of admission is conclusive. Haw Moy v. North, 183 Fed. 89
(C. C. A. 9th, 1910), cert. denied, 223 U. S. 717 (1911).
46. Leung Jun v. United States, 171 Fed. 413 (C. C. A. 2d, 1909).
47. See notes 71 and 72 infra.
48. Gray v. Burdin, 125 Neb. 547, 250 N. W. 907 (1933) (scope of employment);
Pinkton Hardware Co. v. Hart, 159 Okla. 6, 12 P. (2d) 6S1 (1932) (compensability of
injury).
19401 1255
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pertinent statute purports to grant the compensation tribunal full control
over all its determinations.
40
Applicability of a res judicata rule seemingly does not depend on the
formality of the original proceedings. Tribunals and agencies have been held
powerless to correct former errors made without a hearing, 0 or after a
hearing typically incomplete. 51 Nor is the type of tribunal significant. The
same results were reached when a workmen's compensation act was admin-
istered by a court instead of an independent administrative body. 2 The rules
relative to dismissals are the same whether the proceedings are before the
village governing board or the mayor. 3 Even different determinations of
the same officer will be treated in diverse ways.51 Finally, although there
have been strenuous judicial protests against attributing res judicata to
proceedings in which the adjudicator was a party,50 the fact that the pro-
ceedings before the tribunal are not between contesting private individuals
will not necessarily prevent the application of the doctrine.60
To support their position that administrative officers should be restricted
to a single exercise of their discretion, courts have not only stressed the
considerations. of policy underlying the general doctrine of res judicata, but
have argued that the opposite rule would lead to government by whim and
caprice, 51 and induce fraud and improper influence.'; That the original admin-
istrative action may, as a practical matter, be hasty and based on inadequate
information has been widely recognized, but has generally been deemed of
49. Compare Hayden v. R. Wallace & Sons Mfg. Co., 100 Conn. 180, 123 Atd. 9
(1923) with Gonirenki v. American Steel & Wire Co., 106 Conn. 1, 137 Atd. 26 (1927).
50. Edens v. L. E. Dixon Constr'n Co., 42 Ariz. 519, 27 P. (2d) 1107 (1934) (work-
men's compensation); Miller v. Copeland's Estate, 139 Miss. 788, 104 So. 176 (1925)
(tax assessment).
51. Watkins v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 170 Miss. 26, 154 So. 277 (1934) (grant of
a license).
52. For example, a judgment will not be res judicata in the face of change of physi-
cal condition. Mustanen v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 50 Wyo. 462, 62 P. (2d) 287
(1936).
• 53. Stowell v. Santora, 256 App. Div. 934, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 866 (2d Dep't 1939)
(village board); Lilienthal v. Wyandotte, 286 Mich. 604, 282 N. W. 837 (1938) (mayor).
See note 154 infra, and accompanying text.
54. Different rules of conclusiveness attach to rate orders and reparations orders of
the I. C. C. See notes 195-203 infra. The same is true with various determinations of
county boards. Board of County Comm'rs v. Cypert, 65 Okla. 168, 166 Pac. 195 (1917).
55. Board of Comm'rs v. Heaston, 144 Ind. 583, 41 N. E. 457 (1895) ; Royce v. Ro-
sasco, 159 Misc. 236, 287 N. Y. Supp. 692 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
56. Little v. Board of Adjustment, 195 N. C. 793, 143 S. E. 827 (1928) (licensing
board) ; In re Barratt's Appeal, 14 App. D. C. 255 (1899) (patent application).
57. Champlin v. Tax Comm., 163 Okla. 185, 20 P. (2d) 904 (1923).
58. Osterhoudt v. Rigney, 98 N. Y. 222 (1885) ; but the opposite viewpoint has been
taken in Sears v. Stone County, 105 Mo. 236, 16 S. W. 878 (1891).
1256 [Vol. 49 : 1250
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minor importance as against the advantages of convenience and certainty
accruing from the res judicata principle."
Independent Proceedings. The number of cases involving the question of
the conclusiveness of determinations in wholly independent proceedings is
not large enough to permit of confident generalization, other than that the
principle of res judicata has been applied to a wide variety of tribunals.
Here also the dichotomy of quasi-judicial as against administrative action has
been brought into play; the former has been held conclusive, the latter not.Y
A general prerequisite for conclusiveness in any collateral proceeding appears
to be the finality of the original determination, in the sense that no further
proceedings are necessary to make the determination obligatory upon the
parties.0 ' Determinations of the Board of Tax Appeals were originally inef-
fectual except as prima facie evidence in a subsequent suit in a federal circuit
court of appeals, and they were accordingly regarded as not constituting res
judicata. 62 The opposite conclusion was reached after the Revenue Act of
1926 had made provision for finality of the Board's decisions in the absence
of appeal.63 Again, a reparations order of the ICC, whose only conclusive
effect by statute is as prima facie evidence in a federal district court suit for
enforcement, has been held inconclusive, 4 whereas an order directing a
carrier to grant certain credits for services to a shipper (which order must
be appealed from for its effect to be avoided), has been recognized as res
judicata., 5
59. Miller v. Copeland's Estate, 139 Miss. 788, 104 So. 176 (1925). Contra: Equit-
able Trust Co. v. Hamilton, 226 N. Y. 241, 123 N. E. 380 (1919).
60. Determinations labeled quasi-judicial may be followed elsewhere. Swift & Co.
v. Walden, 176 Okla. 268, 55 P. (2d) 71 (1936) (workmen's compensation); State v.
Corron, 73 N. H. 434, 62 At: 1044 (1905) (license board). But the results Uf prezecd-
ings considered investigatory in character are denied conclusive effect. Proper v. Joln
Bene & Sons, 295 Fed. 729 (E. D. N. Y. 1923) (F. T. C.) ; American Motorists Ins. Co.
v. Central Garage, 86 N. H. 362, 169 Ad. 121 (1933) (insurance comm'r).
61. A workmen's compensation award has been held not to be final where all tat
remained to be done was to secure judgment on motion. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co. v. Lawson, 15 F. Supp. 116 (S. D. Ga. 1936). Contra: Taylor v. Rubert Ramay
Co., 139 lid. 113, 114 Atl. 830 (1920).
62. See Griswold, Res Judicata in Federal Tax Cases (1937) 46 YALS L. J. 1320,
1323.
63. Pelham Hall Co. v. Carney, 27 F. Supp. 3S8 (D. Mass. 1939); see Paul and
Zimet, Federal Tax Litigation-Selected Problems in Res Judicata (1937) 32 ILI- L
REav. 139, 140.
64. Clark Bros. Coal Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R-, 241 Pa. 515, 83 Ati. 754
(1913), reversed on other grounds, 283 U. S. 456 (1914).
65. New York C. & H. R. R. R. v. General Elect. Co., 83 'Misc. 529, 146 N. Y. Supp.
322 (Sup. Ct 1914), aff'd, 219 N.Y. 227, 114 N. E. 115 (1916), cert. denied, 243 U. S.
636 (1917).
19401 1257
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION TRIBUNALS
An almost complete immunity from collateral attack has been extended
to awards of state workmen's compensation tribunals. 0 Protection has on
occasion been extended to include the presumption of jurisdictional sufficiency
associated with the acts of courts of record.0 7 Moreover, both state and federal
courts have frequently held that even errors with respect to issues ordinarily
denominated jurisdictional -such as the nature of the commerce in which
the injured individual was engaged- will not expose the administrative order
to collateral nullification. 8 These views are not incompatible with Crowell v.
Benson, 9 which established the doctrine that on direct review a trial de novo
must be given on jurisdictional issues. It is familiar jurisprudence that the
"lack of jurisdiction" concept has varying content for different purposes, so
that what is "jurisdictional" on direct review is not necessarily "jurisdictional"
in a collateral review.
70
This generous protection from collateral attack has been accompanied by
severe restrictions on control by compensation tribunals over their own deter-
minations, not only apart from, but even in spite of, apparent legislative
purpose. Practically all compensation statutes provide that an award may
be modified where an increase or decrease in the physical disability of the
injured workman has subsequently occurred.7 Indeed, this rule is considered
so essential to the policy of compensation systems that it has, on occasion,
been imported into the scheme of administration apart from distinct statutory
66. Collateral attack may be made in a variety of ways. Bach v. Interurban Ry.,
171 N. W. 723, 174 N. W. 333 (Iowa 1919) (defense in suit to enforce award) ; In rc
Philips, 206 App. Div. 314, 200 N. Y. Supp. 639 (1923) (insurer's receivership proceed-
ings). The principal ground for immunity is the availability of direct review tinder the
compensation scheme. Fitt v. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co.,'273 Ill. 617, 113 N. E. 155
(1916).
67. Howard v. Duncan, 163 Okla. 142, 21 P. (2d) 489 (1933). Contra: Hoffnan v.
New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 74 F. (2d) 227 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), cert. denied, 294
U. S. 715 (1935).
68. Taylor v. Robert Ramsey Co., 139 Md. 113, 114 Atl. 830 (1920); Pillsbury v.
Alaska Packers Ass'n, 85 F. (2d) 758 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936), reeld on other grounds, 301
U. S. 174 (1937) (by implication) ; cf. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Elder, 270 U. S. 611
(1926). Contra: London Guar. & Acc. Co. v. Sterling, 233 Mass. 485, 124 N. E. 286
(1919).
69. 285 U. S. 22 (1932). This case has frequently been misinterpreted, however, as
holding that an erroneous determination of the nature of commerce is such a jurisdic-
tional defect as will expose an award to collateral attack. See Comment (1939) 39 CoL.
L. REv. 259, 271; (1940) 34 ILL. L. REV. 626. This is probably due to the fact that the
statutory direct review was by "injunction" proceedings.
70. Lack of federal jurisdiction, for example, will not open a federal court judgment
to collateral attack. Des Moines Nay. Co. v. Iowa Homestead Co., 123 U. S. 552 (1887);
ef. also Thaxter v. Finn, 178 Cal. 270, 173 Pac. 163 (1918).
71. See (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 148. Judicial aflirmance of an award does not oust
the power to modify for change of conditions. State ex rel. Griffin v. State Indust. Ace.
Comm., 145 Ore. 443, 28 P. (2d) 237 (1934).
1258 [Vol. 49: 1250
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authorization. 2 Yet courts, zealous for the principle of conclusiveness, have
held that, since only an "increase or decrease" in compensation is contem-
plated, an original denial of an award owing to insufficient incapacity can
not be corrected for a later aggravation of physical condition."
3
An even dearer demonstration of judicial imposition of res judicata may
be found in the widespread rule that all findings implicit in compensation
orders74 are conclusive on all matters arising prior to the order,7 ' including
questions of the previous physical condition of the compensation caimantY7
It has been held immaterial whether the subsequent proceedings be denom-
inated a rehearing, reopening or an application for modification. 7 In judicial
review of the later proceedings, moreover, the court has been bound by the
same limitations as the tribunals whose action was under review."8
These results have been reached under statutes varying widely in form.
A first group of compensation enactments contains provision for modification
of an award only on a showing of change in extent of disability.70 Here,
a res judicata rule as to other matters,80 in accordance with the maxim
"expressio unins est exclusio altcrius," may be coincident with legislative
intention. A second group of statutes provides for a continuipg jurisdiction
in the compensation tribunal to make such alterations as in the opinion of
the tribunal may be justified, but contains a separate clause calling for modi-
fication on change of physical condition.8 ' With little exception, the courts
have held that the second clause qualified the first, and that the continuing
jurisdiction might be exercised only where the degree of incapacity had
72. Zagar v. Industrial Comm., 40 Ariz. 479, 14 P. (2d) 472 (1932).
73. Hurst v. Independent Constr'n Co., 136 Kan. 583, 16 P. (2d) 540 (1932). Con-
tra: Patterson Steel Co. v. Bailey, 148 Okla. 153, 298 Pac. 282 (1931), (1931) 31 COL.
L. REv. 1206.
74. The order may grant, deny or discontinue compensation. Edens v. L E. Dixon
Constr'n Co., 42 Ariz. 519, 27 P. (2d) 1107 (1934); Gray v. Burdin, 125 Neb. 547, 250
N. IV. 907 (1933) ; Simpson Constr'n Co. v. Industrial Bd., 275 I1. 366, 114 N. E. 13S
(1916).
75. See cases cited in notes 79-86 in lra; cf. Riley v. Board of Trustees, 210 Iowa
449, 228 N. NV. 578 (1930), in which an identical rule was applied to an order denying
a disability pension.
76. Comer v. Standard Oil Co., 131 Me. 386, 163 Ad. 269 (1932).
77. Brown v. Industrial Comm., 48 Ariz. 161, 59 P. (2d) 323 (1936); Conners'
Case, 121 'Me. 37, 115 At. 520 (1921). But there may be statutory provision for rehear-
ing within a specified time. Thrash v. Graver Corp., 131 Okla. 260, 263 Pac. 718 (1923).
78. Pillsbury v. Alaska Packers Ass'n, 85 F. (2d) 758 (C. C. A. 9tb, 1936), r *'d
on other grounds, 301 U. S. 174 (1937); Brown v. Industrial Comm., 48 Ariz. 161, 59
P. (2d) 323 (1936).
79. Ga. CoDE (1933) § 114-709; Burts IND. STAT. (1933) § 40-1410.
80. Lattimore v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 35 Ga. App. 250, 133 S. E. 291
(1926); Carson-Payson Co. v. Industrial Comm., 285 I1. 635, 121 X. E. 264 (1918).
81. Oa. CODE ANN. (1930) 49-1836(c) 49-1,27(i); MoT. REV. Corm (1935)
§§ 2952, 2956.
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changed.8 2 Such an interpretation may be reinforced by invoking a stipula-
tion, appearing elsewhere in the statute, for finality of a compensation order
in the absence of review proceedings.83 But this conclusion is by no means
inescapable. Both the New York and the Oklahoma statutes, for example,
contain all three clauses in identical language, but only the latter state's
statute has been given a res judicata construction.8 4 A third group of statutes
provides for continuing jurisdiction without specification of the grounds on
which it is to be exercised.8 5 Yet the same rule of conclusiveness in the
absence of changed conditions has prevailed.80 Only where there has been
an unmistakable expression of legislative desire, such as stipulation for
reversal on the ground of mistake, has a contrary rule been adopted.8 7
Judicial predilection for res judicata in disregard of legislative policy is
strikingly reflected in the history of the federal Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act.88 Originally the Act provided only for modi-
fication on change of conditions, and it was held that these were the exclusive
grounds on which a reopening could be had.s9 The Act was subsequently
amended to permit a new compensation order because of a mistake of fact,
"whether or riot a compensation order has been issued." Decisions were
nevertheless handed down to the effect that if there were no error in ruling
on the evidence presented at the first hearing, there was no such mistake of
fact as warranted reversal;0° and that there could be no reversal if a grant
of compensation were originally denied.01 These decisions provoked further
82. State ex rel. Roundup Coal Mining Co. v. Industrial Acc. Bd., 94 Mont. 386, 23
P. (2d) 253 (1933) ; American Oil & Ref. Co. v. Kincannon, 154 Okla. 129, 3 P. (2d)
877 (1931), (1932) 9 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 383; cf. Schmitt v. American Brass Co., 109
Conn. 599, 145 Atl. 164 (1929).
83. Roxanna Petroleum Co. v. Hornberger, 150 Okla. 257, 1 P. (2d) 393 (1931),
(1931) 41 YALE L. J. 148.
84. Compare Di Donato v. Rosenberg, 256 N. Y. 412, 176 N. E. 822 (1931) with
Pinkton Hardware Co. v. Hart, 159 Okla. 6, 12 P. (2d) 681 (1932).
85. MAss. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 152, §§ 11, 12; MICH. STAT. ANN. (1937) § 17.188,
86. Kareske's Case, 250 Mass. 220, 145 N. E. 301 (1924); Sampson v. Michigan
Copper & Brass Co., 274 Mich. 592, 265 N. W. 472 (1936).
87. London Guar. & Ace. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 78 Colo. 478, 242 Pac. 680 (1925);
Industrial Comm. v. Dell, 104 Ohio St. 389, 135 N. E. 669 (1922). In California, a statu-
tory amendment caused the court to drop its rule that awards were res judicata. Bartlett
Hayward Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 203 Cal. 522, 265 Pac. 195 (1928).
Judicial affirmance of an award, however, will oust a continuing jurisdiction to correct
errors. United Dredging Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm., 208 Cal. 705, 284 Pac. 922 (1930).
Contra: DiDonato v. Rosenberg, 256 N. Y. 412, 176 N. E. 822 (1931).
88. 44 STAT. 1437 (1927), 48 STAT. 807 (1934), 52 STAT. 1167 (1938), 33 U. S. C.
§ 922 (Supp. 1939).
89. Rothschild & Co. v. Marshall, 44 F. (2d) 546 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930).
90. Gravel Products Corp. v. McManigal, 14 F. Supp. 414 (W. D. N. Y. 1936).
91. La Terza v. Lowe, 15 F. Supp. 978 (E. D. N. Y. 1936). Contra: Maryland Cas-
ualty Co. v. Cardillo, 99 F. (2d) 432 (App. D. C. 1938).
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statutory amendment, which apparently leave the compensation officials with
practically full control over their prior orders.
0 2
In those jurisdictions adopting the narrower view that each order of the
compensation tribunal is res judicata except for change in conditions, it is
generally immaterial whether the prior findings erred on a matter of fact"3
or of law,94 or whether they were made without a hearingz3 But there has
been some relaxation of the res judicata rule. Newly discovered evidence,
if not negligently omitted earlier, has been held to justify a reopening of
matters once decided.9 6 Likewise, proof of a newly-discovered internal injury,
as distinct from a change of physical condition, has sufficed to justify a modi-
fication.97 Reopening has also been allowed where an award was procured
through fraudulent testimony. 8
The argument has been made that a liberal construction of v.orlmen's
compensation statutes requires that no injured employee be deprived of his
due compensation through administrative error.50 This argument gains force
in the light of the fact that the public has an interest in seeing that incapacity
for self-support should not go uncompensated. But if the claimant is to be
unhampered by res judicata, the courts feel that the same privilege should
be accorded to employers.' 00 Abrogation of the res judicata principle, further-
more, would allow delay and the perpetuation of controversy, which are far
more likely to be injurious to the employee than to the employer.' 0 ' These
latter considerations appear more compelling than those arguing for a com-
plete freedom of reversal. It seems distinctly undesirable, on the other hand,
to apply res judicata to the frequent determinations made without full hearing.
92. Bethlehem Shipbldg. Corp. v. Cardillo, 102 F. (2d) 299 (C. C. A. 1st, 1939),
cert. denied, 307 U. S. 645 (1939).
93. Oklahoma Ry. v. State Industrial Comm, 147 Olda. 129, 295 Pac. 216 (1931).
94. Hayden v. R. Wallace & Sons Mfg. Co., 100 Conn. 180, 123 Ad. 9 (1923) (em-
ployment relationship).
95. An order will be binding even though made after the perfunctory hearing usually
had in originally uncontested cases. Edens v. L. E. Dixon Constr'n Co., 42 Ariz. 519,
27 P. (2d) 1107 (1934). Even an agreement between the parties, when approvcd by the
compensation tribunal according to statute, wvill be conclusive. Pedlow v. Swartz Elect.
Co., 68 Ind. App. 400, 120 N. E. 603 (1918). In general, orders made by subordinate
officials are as conclusive as those of the commission or board itself. Martin v. Kalama-
zoo Veg. Parchment Co., 271 Mich. 514, 260 N. W. 753 (1935).
96. Gonirenki v. American Steel & Wire Co., 106 Conn. 1, 137 At]. 27 (1927). Cot:-
Ira: American Oil & Ref. Co. v. Kincannon, 154 Okla. 129, 3 P. (2d) 877 (1931).
97. Devoe's Case, 131 Me. 452, 163 Ad. 789 (1933). Contra: Simpson Constr'n
Co. v. Industrial Board, 275 Ill. 366, 114 N. E. 133 (1916).
98. Grabowski v. Miskell, 97 Conn. 76, 115 Ad. 691 (1921).
99. Beckman v. J. XV. Oelerich & Son, 174 App. Div. 353, 160 N. Y. Supp. 791 (34
Dep't 1916).
100. Conners' Case, 121 'Me. 37, 115 Adt. 520 (1921).
101. Cf. Conners' Case, 121 Me. 37, 115 Ad. 520 (1921) ; Shugg v. Anaconda C.tppr
& Mining Co., 100 Mont. 159, 46 P. (2d) 435 (1935).
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To escape the confinements of res judicata, compensation tribunals have
sought to reserve jurisdiction over their orders. The majority of these efforts
have been frustrated on the ground that such a reservation is outside statutory
authority. 10 2 The SEC and the NLRB, on the other hand, have frequently
used this device as a means of escaping whatever effect their orders may have
as res judicata.10 3 The paramount public interest protected by these federal
agencies, demanding a continuing regulatory jurisdiction, makes it probable
that their use of the technique will not come under judicial condemnation." 1
A full-fledged res judicata rule has generally been applied to compensation
findings when offered as evidence in independent proceedings- whether
judicial or administrative.10 5 The most conspicuous exception is the prevail-
ing rule that the receipt of one compensation award will not bar another
compensation proceeding in another state whose statute also covers the injury
giving rise to the claimed disability.10 6 Even in this situation, however, the
claimant has been bound by findings in the initial proceeding, 07 and invariably
charged with whatever sums he received as the result of the initial proceed-
ings. 08 Another exception to the res judicata rule may be made where the
law applicable to the original award permits its complete control by the
compensation tribunal.100 But the greater number of cases hold that even
under such circumstances, the award may not be collaterally questioned.110
102. United Fruit Co. v. Pillsbury, 55 F. (2d) 369 (N. D. Calif. 1932); Trigg v,
Industrial Comm., 364 11. 581, 5 N. E. (2d) 394 (1936). But cf. Utah-Idaho C. Ry. V.
Public Util. Comm., 64 Utah 54, 227 Pac. 1025 (1924) (state railroad commission). '
103. Matter of Mass. Util. Ass'n, 3 S. E. C. 639 (1938) ; Iowa So. Util. Co., 15 N. L.
R. B. 580 (1939).
104. In C. G. Conn. v. N. L. R. B., 108 F. (2d) 390 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939), this prac-
tice was expressly sanctioned in the case of the Labor Board. See notes 141-146 infra.
105. Biederzycki v. Farrel Foundry & Mach. Co., 103 Conn. 701, 131 Atd. 739 (1926);
Amalgamated Roofing Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 300 II1. 487, 133 N. E. 259 (1921). Is-
sues not actually litigated have been held concluded in the independent proceeding if they
might have been raised in the compensation proceeding. Royal Indem. Co. v. Heller, 256
N. Y. 322, 176 N. E. 410 (1931); Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp. v. Pruitt, 58 S. W. (2d) 41
(Tex. Comm. App. 1933). Contra: Hoffman v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 74 F.
(2d) 227 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), cert. denied, 294 U. S. 715 (1934).
106. See Abel, Credit Given Administrative Determinations (1937) 22 IowA L. Ruv.
461, 486.
107. Harshbarger v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 10th Biennial Report of Iowa Work-
men's Compensation Service (1932) 77; Di Carvallo v. Di Napoli, 13 N. J. Misc. 603,
180 At. 488 (N. J. Dept. of Labor, 1935).
108. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Lawson, 15 F. Supp. 116 (S. D. Ga. 1936);
Gilbert v. Des Lauriers Column Moulding Co., 180 App. Div. 59, 167 N. Y. Supp. 274
(3d Dept. 1917).
109. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Comm., 7 Cal. App. (2d) 190,
45 P. (2d) 371 (1935).
110. Nash v. Brooks, 276 N. Y. 75, 11 N. E. (2d) 545 (1937); Ocean Ace. & Guar.
Corp. v. Pruitt, 58 S. W. (2d) 41 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
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TAXING AUTHORITIES
Courts appear to be in general agreement that state tax assessments, if
within the jurisdiction of the taxing authority, are not subject to collateral
attack. This rule has been pronounced in suits for refunds (although the
taxes may have been paid under protest), in proceedings to enjoin the col-
lection of a tax, in suits by the government to collect an assessment and even
where a tax claim has been submitted in 77B proceedings."' Conclusiveneess
has been supported either on the ground of statutory provisions according
finality to the assessment,1'" or on the ground of adequacy of direct appellate
procedure.113 Under the federal income tax scheme, on the other hand, a
species of collateral attack has been made available in the form of statutory
suits for refund of an allegedly erroneously assessed tax."14
Although state courts have followed the statutory lead in immunizing assess-
ments against collateral attack, they have shown far less respect for legis-
lative intention with respect to the power of taxing authorities to review
their own determinations through the medium of reassessments. Statutes
often provide broadly for the back assessment of property which has been
omitted from, or has escaped, taxation.n-' Yet a reassessment on the ground
of omissions or undervaluations with respect to an item of property in the
taxpayer's return has usually been defeated on the somewhat amazing theory
that the property in question has already been subject to levy, however inade-
quate.1 l Even a statutory provision for reassessment whenever the original
levy was incorrect has been interpreted to authorize action only when the
tax officials, subsequent to the original assessment, have been apprised of
new facts."17 Fraud sufficient to warrant the reopening of an assessment must
involve actual collusion with government agents.118 Deliberate failures to list
111. Braley v. City of Barre, 88 Vt. 251, 92 Atl. 236 (1914) (suit for refund). Con-
Ira: Kurn v. Board of County Comm'rs, 141 Kan. 7, 40 P. (2d) 321 (1935); Mileim
v. Moffat Tunnel Dist., 262 U. S. 710 (1922) (injunction) ; Harrington v. Glidden, 179
Mass. 486, 61 N. E. 54 (1901) (suit by government) ; In re 163 Adams Bldg. Curp., 27
F. Supp. 247 (N. D. II. 1939) (77B proceedings).
112. Ford 'Motor Co. v. State, 178 Okla. 193, 62 P. (2d) 48 (1936).
113. State v. Jefferson County Bank, 200 Ala. 287, 76 So. 53 (1917).
114. 42 STAT. 311 (1921), 28 U. S. C. § 41(20) (1934). Attack by injunction is ex-
plicitly prohibited. REv. STAT. § 3224 (1885), 26 U. S. C. § 1543 (1934).
115. IOWA CODE (1939) §7105.1; Miss. CoDE ANv. (1930) §3197.
116. Commonwealth v. J. Al. Robinson, Norton & Co., 146 Ky. 218, 142 S. A. 405
(1912); Langhout v. First Nat. Bank, 191 Ioxwa 957, 183 N. V~r. 505 (1921). But cf.
Adams v. Clarke, 80 Miss. 134, 31 So. 216 (1902).
Reassessment will be allowed where there has been a manifest clerical error in the
original assessment. American Tobacco Co. v. Commonwealth, 162 Ky. 716, 172 S. NV.
1085 (1915) ; State cx rel. Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Works, 143 Wash.
67, 254 Pac. 839 (1927) (railroad valuation).
117. State ex rel. Schuster Realty Co. v. Lyons, 184 Wisc. 175, 197 N. V. 5S5 (1924).
118. Compare State cx rel. Tax Comm. v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., 171 Ola. 493,
41 P. (2d) 876 (1935) with Adams v. Clarke, 80 Miss. 134, 31 So. 216 (1902).
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items of property or to report accurate valuations have not been deemed
sufficiently reprehensible to overcome the presumption that the tax assessor
had performed his duty of full investigation of the facts before determining
fhe amount of the levy.119 There seems to be even less inclination to allow
reassessment where the error has been one of law.
120
This judicial preference for conclusiveness apparently extends to the col-
lection of every type of tax, whether levied on property, franchises, income or
corporations.' 21 It has prevailed, moreover, despite judicial recognition of
the practical considerations which argue against any inflexible restrictions
on the taxing power. It has been conceded that initial assessments are habit-
ually hurried, that it is impossible adequately to check every return and that
as a practical matter, assessors rely on information reported by the tax-
payer. 12 2 But the annoyance and uncertainty experienced by the citizen under
a practice of repeated assessments, especially when based solely on a changed
view of the same facts, have proved the more persuasive factors.'
23
The federal income tax procedure differs from the state systems in that
the original assessment is made by the taxpayer himself.12 4 With its explicit
provision for successive deficiency assessments,1 25 the federal tax structure
implies a complete abnegation of res judicata principles. Nevertheless, the
prejudice against revision of a judgment once made has found expression
in several federal cases. Two proceeded on a theory bearing full resemblance
to the doctrine of res judicata.12 0 Others (including the famous Woodworth
119. Commonwealth v. J. M. Robinson, Norton & Co., 146 Ky. 218, 142 S. W. 406
(1912).
120. Anniston City Land Co. v. State, 185 Ala. 482, 64 So. 110 (1913). But cf. Buick
Motor Co. v. Milwaukee, 43 F. (2d) 385 (E. D. Wisc. 1930), aff'd, 48 F. (2d) 801 (C.
C. A. 7th, 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 655 (1931), in which the court imports sonic of
the flexibility of the federal tax system into the state scheme.
121. State ex rel. Tax Comm. v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., 171 Okla. 498, 41 P. (2d)
876 (1935) (property) ; Coulter v. Louisville Bridge Co., 114 Ky. 42, 70 S. W. 29 (1902)
(franchises); State ex rel. Ford 'Motor Co. v. Gehner, 325 Mo. 24, 27 S. W. (2d) 1
(1930) (income); Commonwealth v. Kentucky Heating Co., 176 Ky. 35, 195 S. W. 459,
180 Ky. 607, 203 S. W. 538 (1918) (corporations).
122. Cf. dissent in Miller v. Copeland's Estate, 139 Miss. 788, 812, 104 So. 176,
177 (1925), which argues also that permitting unlisted property to go untaxed is both
unfair to other taxpayers and conducive to fraud.
123. Champlin v. Oklahoma Tax Comm., 163 Okla. 185, 20 P. (2d) 904 (1933). An
additional consideration is the apparent injustice of permitting the government to reopen
questions of tax liability while the taxpayer is concluded by his payment on the original
assessment. Coulter v. Louisville Bridge Co., 114 Ky. 42, 70 S. W. 29 (1902).
124. In most state tax systems, all assessments are made by government officials.
Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. R. Co. v. Board of Educ., 80 F. (2d) 307 (C. C. A. 5th,
1935).
125. 48 STAT. 740, 26 U. S. C. § 271 (1934). An erroneous refund may be collected
either by a suit for its recovery [Talcott v. United States, 23 F. (2d) 897 (C. C. A. 9th,
1928)] or a subsequent deficiency assessment [Burnet v. Porter, 283 U. S. 230 (1931)].
126. Boyne City Lumber Co. v. Doyle, 47 F. (2d) 772 (W. D. Mich. 1930); Penrose
v. Skinner, 298 Fed. 335 (D. Col. 1923).
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v. Kales decision), although offering rationales that are difficult to unravel,
appear to involve strong elements of estoppel.2 7 Subsequent decisions, how-
ever, have strongly discredited these holdings. s' 8 Federal courts have seem-
ingly recognized that the exigencies of income tax administration and the
desirability of uniform taxation'20 prohibit the importation of a rule of con-
clusiveness. Since 1930, courts1 30 and the Board of Tax Appeals 3 I have
consistently held that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may reverse
his determinations any time within the statute of limitations, and that reliance
by the taxpayer to his prejudice on either formal rulings and action of the
Commissioner's office' -32 or informal advices by revenue agents,13 will not
support an estoppel against tax liability. Informal compromises of tax liability
are similarly ineffectual, inasmuch as the prescribed statutory procedure for
formally settling tax claims has been deemed exclusive. 234
127. Voodworth v. Kales, 26 F. (2d) 178 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928), cert. denied, 2 N) U.
S. 570 (1928) ; United States v. Detroit Steel Prod. Co., 20 F. (24) 675 (E. D. Mich.
1927).
128. The Kales case has never been squarely overruled, inasmuch as it arose out of a
unique controversy. The practice of anticipatory tax determinations involved Fad long
since been discontinued when the Kales case came to court. Cf. James Couzens, 11 B. T. A.
1040 (1928). Section 801(a) of the Revenue Act of 1938, however, provides for binding
closing agreements as to future tax liabilities. 52 STAT. 573 (1938), 26 U. S. C. § 3769(a)
(Supp. 1939).
129. Reopening of assessments is necessary to allow subsequent judicial and adminis-
trative decisions to be applied to all similarly situated taxpayers. Cf. United States v.
Tuthill Spring Co., 55 F. (2d) 415 (N. D. I1. 1931); Alex T. Soholow, 22 B. T. A.
349 (1931).
130. Burnet v. Porter, 283 U. S. 230 (1931); Stanford Univ. Book Store v. Helver-
ing, 83 F. (2d) 710 (App. D. C. 1936). The changed determination may invulve a re-
valuation on the same facts. Levy v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 48 r. (2d) 725 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1931).
Where, however, federal tax statutes are silent on the subject of the Commisioners
control over his determinations, federal courts have reverted to their res judicata lean-
ings. It has been stated that so long as the Commissioner is confronted by the ,ame
facts, he will not be allowed to reverse his discretionary judgment as to whether a statu-
tory special assessment shall be granted. Austin Co. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 35 F.
(2d) 910, 912 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929), ccrt denied, 281 U. S. 735 (1930) ; Page v. Lafay-
ette Worsted Co., 66 F. (2d) 339 (C. C. A. 1st, 1933), cert. denied, 2q0 U. S. 692 (1933).
131. Barbara Archer, 37 B. T. A. 299 (1938); Southern Md. Agric. Fair Ass, 40
B. T. A. No. 86 (1939).
132. Harriton v. Lucas, 41 F. (2d) 429 (App. D. C. 1930) (question of substantive
obligation) ; Esperson v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 49 F. (2d) 259 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931),
cert. denied. 284 U. S. 658 (1931) (question of administrative practice). But cf. Hel-
vering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U. S. 110 (1939), cited infra note 230.
133. Darling v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 49 F. (2d) 111 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931), cerl.
denied, 283 U. S. 866 (1931).
134. L. Loewvy & Sons v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 31 F. (24) 652 (C. C. A. 2d,
1929). But cf. American Oil & Ref. Co. v. Kincannon, 154 Okla. 129, 3 P. (24) .77
(1931) (workmen's compensation).
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LICENSING TRIBUNALS
The action of state licensing agencies has uniformly been held to be con-
clusive against collateral attack. A problem of this nature arises when, in a
prosecution for acting without a license, the defense is interposed that the
license had illegally been refused. Whether or not the criteria for the issuance
of a license necessitated the exercise of discretion, there has been apparently
little dissent from the rule that a defense of this nature is unavailing, 35
because there is an adequate and exclusive remedy by mandamus.18 0 No
distinction has been made between errors of fact or of law in the mistaken
refusal to grant the license. 137 The same result has been reached even where
the denial of a license was based on an unconstitutional section of a statute,
provided that the entire statute was not thereby rendered invalid.1 8
An initial rejection of an application for a license has, with equal uniformity,
been regarded by state courts as precluding a contrary decision on a subse-
quent application based on a record substantially identical with that formerly
presented.12 9 It has been stated explicitly that the licensing tribunal will
not be permitted a second time to weigh private interests against the claims
of public convenience and welfare. 140 A radically different approach was
enunciated in the recently decided Pottsville case,141 involving not only the
relationship between the Federal Communications Commission and the review-
ing Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,142 but the extent to which
the Commission should be governed by its former action, 48 The Supreme
Court was unequivocal in its declaration that, since the Commission was
primarily an instrument of public control rather than a tribunal for the
135. Phoenix Carpet Co. v. State, 118 Ala. 143, 22 So. 627 (1887); Montpelier v.
Mills, 171 Ind. 175, 85 N. E. 6 (1908). Contra: Fossett v. Rock Island Lumber Mfg.
Co., 76 Kan. 428, 92 Pac. 833 (1907).
136. The defense of an illegal refusal to license can not be raised in a suit to enjoin
the unlicensed activity. New York v. 0. J. Gude Co., 122 App. Div. 741, 107 N. Y.
Supp. 484 (2d Dep't 1907).
137. Montpelier v. Mills, 171 Ind. 175, 85 N. E. 6 (1908) (error of fact); Common-
wealth v. McCarthy, 225 Mass. 192, 114 N. E. 287 (1916) (error of law).
138. State v. Stevens, 78 N. H. 268, 99 Atl. 723 (1916) ; Lipkin v. Duffy, 118 N. J.
L. 84, 191 AtI. 288 (1937).
139. Cardinal Bus Lines v. Consolidated Coach Corp., 254 Ky. 586, 72 S. W. (2d)
7 (1934); People ex rel. Swedish Hospital v. Leo, 120 Misc. 355, 198 N. Y. Supp. 397
(Sup. Ct. 1923), aff'd, 215 App. Div. 696, 212 N. Y. Supp. 897 (1925).
140. Little v. Board of Adjustment, 195 N. C. 793, 143 S. E. 827 (1928) ; McGarry
v. Walsh, 213 App. Div. 289, 210 N. Y. Supp. 286 (2d Dep't 1925).
141. F.C.C. v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 437 (U. S. 1940).
142. It was held that the Commission was not under the same obligation to follow
a mandate of the Court of Appeals that a lower federal court would be.
143. The decision also involves a holding that the action of the Commission in grant-
ing an application independent consideration will not preclude the Commission from
later subjecting the application to the competition of other applications afterward re-
ceived.
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adjudication of private rights, considerations of effective enforcement of the
statutory policy eclipsed ordinary rules of judicial litigation. 1 " Erroneous
action by an administrative agency will thus not be regarded as foreclosing
it from effectuating the legislation committed to its charge.14 To be compared
with the Pottsville doctrine is the holding in United States ex rel. Strachcy
v. Reimer that a United States consul might not revoke a visa after an alien,
in reliance on the visa, had embarked on his voyage, even though subsequent
investigation by the consul indicated that the alien was ineligible for admission
to this country.140 The irreparable prejudice which would have resulted from
a contrary holding, constituted an equitable element with which the un-
compromising pronouncements in the Pottsville case had not been obliged
to cope. Furthermore, the claims of the individual to certainty of status and
to freedom from continual vexation, which frequently demand recognition
in problems facing other federal agencies, make it probable that the Pottsville
viewpoint will not receive universal application.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, for instance, has apparently
decided that the balance of policy is tipped in favor of protecting private
action which follows a prior determination. This was indicated in the Com-
mission's refusal to reverse a concededly incorrect prior finding of security
exemption after the securities had been issued on the basis of the exemption
order.147 The Commission has held, on the other hand, that its preliminary
orders consenting to the amendment of a registration statement will not bar
it from finding in a later stop-order proceeding that the statement or amend-
ment contained material misrepresentation.14
The question of the conclusiveness of licensing agency determinations in
independent proceedings is of particular interest in view of the provisions
of the Securities Act of 1933 allowing civil suits by security purchasers on
the same grounds of deficiency in a registration statement that afford the basis
for an SEC stop order. 4 9 At first blush, it would seem that a private indi-
144. Cf. Brougham v. Blanton Mfg. Co., 249 U. S. 495 (1919), holding that the Gov-
ernment control established under the meat inspection statutes vwas not exhausted by an
original exercise, and that, accordingly, approval of a trade name could be revo!:ed
although it had been employed in business for several years. There had been, however,
considerable change of circumstance between the two decisions.
145. See 60 Sup. Ct. at 442 (U. S. 1940).
146. 101 F. (2d) 267 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
147. In re the Application of Intern'l Paper & Power Co., 2 S. E. C. 792 (1937). In
other situations, however, the Commission has not hesitated to issue a stop order after
the securities issue in question has been completely marketed. In re Oklahoma-Te.as
Trust, 2 S. E. C. 764 (1937).
148. Consent to a post-effective amendment merely involved a finding that the amend-
ment contained no apparent inaccuracies on its face. Matter of Bankers Union Life Co.,
2 S. E. C. 63 (1937). An order accelerating a pre-effective amendment is only an admin-
istrative act which cannot constitute a quasi-judicial determination that the registration
statement was free of deficiencies. Matter of Breeze Corp., 3 S. E. C. 709 (1933).
149. Compare § 8(d) 48 STAT. 79, 15 U. S. C. § 77h(d) (1934) with § 11(a) 43 SrTT.
82, 15 U. S. C. § 77k(a) (1934).
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vidual could not take advantage of findings in a license revocation proceeding
to which he was not a party.'5 0 Yet there is some judicial authority for the
proposition that a party who has fully litigated an adjudication will be bound
by it in a later controversy with a non-party.151 There have been frequent
instances, moreover, in which administrative determinations have been given
an in rent effect. 152 Thus, the revocation of a liquor license for violation of
a statute has been held conclusive of that issue in a subsequent suit on the
licensee's bond.153  Security issuers, however, frequently consent to the is-
suance of a possibly unwarranted stop order, finding it more expedient to
amend their registration statements than to engage in litigious hearings before
the SEC. Courts will therefore probably be reluctant to hold a stop order
with a history of this character binding on the issuer in a later private con-
troversy.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Problems of the conclusiveness of prior determinations arise at many
points in the ramified Labor Board procedure. Of major importance is the
question presented by a second proceeding on the same charges, the earlier
proceeding having failed for some reason to produce an enforceable order.
A fairly close analogue to the Labor Board proceedings may be found in
hearings before various administrative bodies relative to the dismissal of
officers on charges. Whatever action is taken has generally been held to
constitute res judicata, both as to the administrative agency itselfl" and
on collateral attack.15 5 The Labor Board, however, has thus far declined to
150. It was so held in Royce v. Rosasco, 159 Misc. 236, 287 N. Y. Supp. 692 (Sup. Ct.
. 1936). Where, however, there is no problem of failure of identity of parties, as on a
subsequent application for a different license by the same party, it seems clear that the
licensing board, barring changed circumstances, will be bound by its original findings.
Watkins v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 170 Miss. 26, 154 So. 277 (1934).
151. Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 172 Atl. 260 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1934).
152. Thus, the administrative determination of the public utility status of a water com-
pany will bind non-parties in a subsequent action. Goodspeed v. Great Western Power
Co., 33 Cal. App. (2d) 245, 91 P. (2d) 623 (1939). The same has been held with re-
spect to workmen's compensation awards. Slattery v. Board of Est. & Apport. 271 N. Y.
346, 3 N. E. (2d) 505 (1936). Contra: Williams v. Southern Pac. Co., 54 Cal. App. 571,
202 Pac. 356 (1921). And a party who has litigated an issue in compensation proceed-
ings will be bound in a later controversy with a non-party. Biederzycki v. Farrel Foun-
dry & Mach. Co., 103 Conn. 701, 131 Atl. 739 (1926) ; Sampson v. Michigan Copper &
Brass Co., 274 Mich. 592, 265 N. W. 472 (1936).
153. State v. Corron, 73 N. H. 434, 62 Atl. 1044 (1905).
154. Lilienthal v. Wyandotte, 286 Mich. 604, 282 N. W. 837 (1938) (attempted dis-
missal after original quashing of charges); Hyland v. Waldo, 158 App. Div. 654, 143
N. Y. Supp. 901 (1st Dep't 1913) (attempted reversal of dismissal).
155. Queen v. Atlanta, 59 Ga. 318 (1877) ; Derrick v. Gaston School Dist., 172 S. C.
472, 174 S. E. 431 (1934). Both cases involved suits for salary for a period following
the dismissal. But cf. State ex rel. Plunkett v. Miller, 162 Miss. 149, 137 So. 737 (1931).
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commit itself on the consequences of dismissing a complaint after hearing.6 0
True, the Board has denied that the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy has application to its proceedings, which are legally non-criminal
in character.3 7 And, in at least one opinion dismissing a complaint, the
statement was made that new evidence might warrant another complaint on
the same facts.' 58 On several occasions, however, a plea of res judicata h-s
been denied on the ground that the particular situation lay outside the rule.'C9
But there has been no forthright statement that res judicata is totally inap-
plicable. The Board, moreover, has been careful at times to indicate that
the dismissal of a complaint was without prejudice.'0 0
The circuit courts of appeal, however, have apparently proceeded on the
definite theory that exoneration of a respondent may bar further enforce-
ment action. Thus, while the Board has been allowed to reinstate a complaint
it dismissed after hearing but without prejudice, the argument by which
the court reached this result left no doubt that the reservation of jurisdiction
was considered a crucial factor. 10 ' In another case, a circuit court of appeals
was deliberately explicit in dismissing a portion of a complaint "with preju-
dice." 162 It should be noted, however, that the function of the Labor Board
is primarily to guard the national economic welfare, and only incidentally to
vindicate private' interests.0 3 The Board would therefore seem to be the
type of agency that fits into the rationale of the Pottsville case, and should
thereby be free of the confinements of the res judicata principle.
In situations other than a second proceeding on the same charges, however,
the Board itself has found it expedient to attach varying degrees of con-
clusiveness to several of its determinations. A finding in a complaint pro-
ceeding that a union was company dominated was deened so far to conclude
the question that in subsequent complaint or certification proceedings no evi-
dence was received on that issue.16 4 Similarly, where an appropriate unit was
designated in a certification proceeding, new evidence on the unit issue that
156. The Board has firmly announced that the withdrawal of charges or the dismis-
sal of a complaint before hearing on the merits will not serve per se as the basis for a
plea of res judicata. Ingram Mfg. Co., 5 N. L. R. B. 90S (1938) ; Shuron Optical Co.,
11 N. L. R. B. 859 (1939).
157. Halff Mfg. Co., 16 N. L. R. B. No. 6S, p. 16 (1939).
158. American-Hanaiian S. S. Co., 6 N. L. R. B. 678, 6,4 (1938).
159. Shuron Optical Co., 11 N. L. R. B. 859 (1939); Halff Mfg. Co., 16 N. L. R. B.
No. 68 (1939).
160. Ferguson Brothers Mfg. Co., 9 N. L. R. B. 189 (1938).
161. C. G. Conn v. N. L. R. B., 108 F. (2d) 390 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939).
162. Semet-Solvay Co. v. N. L. R. B., 100 F. (2d) 1020 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938).
163. See the preamble to the National Labor Relations Act. 49 STAT. 449 (1935),
29 U. S. C. § 151 (Supp. 1939). The rules of the Board provide that a complaint may
not be dismissed or charges withdrawn without the Board's consent. N. L. . B. R.LErs
AND REGULATIONS II § 1 (1939).
164. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 15 N. L. R. B. 515 (1939); Kansas City Structural
Steel Co., 18 N. L. R. B. No. 45 (1940).
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could reasonably have been presented earlier was rejected in a later complaint
proceeding.Y6 5 The Board has laid down the further rule that the certification
of a union as exclusive bargaining agent precludes another certification within
a year, 166 unless some striking change of circumstances indicates that the
existing certification has become outdated. 16 7 Nevertheless, the dismissal of
a certification petition will not bar a reopening,'6 8 nor is there any obstacle
to setting aside a certification order on a rehearing when new evidence is
presented. 69
*Res judicata, it has been stated, does not in any manner prevent modifi-
cation of a bargaining unit designation. 17 0 Reconsideration of a unit deter-
mination has been allowed for new evidence,'17  and alteration of a deter-
mination has been made whenever changes in conditions so warranted.172
Unit determinations, however, although contrary to established rules, have
not been disturbed unless demonstrated to be unsatisfactory.Y7
Owing to the stipulation in the NLRA that the Board shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over questions arising under it' 4 the relationship between the
Labor Board and the courts is far from clear. It can scarcely be doubted
that a judicial determination will ordinarily control subsequent administrative
action, whenever the factual requisites for res judicata exist.175 The Board,
however, has been adamant in its stand that it is not bound by a legal or
165. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 15 N. L. R. B. 515 (1939). But the certification of
a union as exclusive bargaining agent is no bar to a finding in subsequent complaint pro-
ceedings that the union is company-dominated. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 19 N, L. R.
B. No. 85 (1940).
166. American Hair & Felt Co., 15 N. L. R. B. 572 (1939); cf. Todd Johnson Dry
Docks, 10 N. L. R. B. 629 (1938). A state labor board has seen fit to adopt a similar
policy. In re Reich-McJunkin Dairy Co., 5 LAn. REL. REP. 19 (Pa. L. R. B. 1939).
167. International Nickel Co., 19 N. L. R. B. No. 94 (1940) (hiring of a large num-
ber of additional employees).
168. Todd Johnson Dry Docks, 10 N. L. R. B. 629 (1938).
169. American-Hawaiian S. S. Co., 6 N. L. R. B. 678 (1938).
170. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 9 N. L. R. B. 557 (1938). A union which had peti-
tioned for and received a designation as bargaining agent on the basis of an industrial
unit is not precluded from thereafter being certified as bargaining agent for a smaller
unit. Jones Lumber Co., 12 N. L. R. B. 209 (1939).
Board Member Leiserson, however, has dissented from this asserted freedom of action,
arguing that it renders stable collective bargaining impossible and interferes with rights
established in designated units. Bendix Products Corp., 15 N. L. R. B. 965, 971 (1939).
171. Federated Fishing Boats of N. E. & N. Y., 15 N. L. R. B. 1080 (1939).
172. Chrysler Corp., 17 N. L. R. B. No. 64 (1939) (unexpected election results);
Ryan Aeronautical Co., 15 N. L. R. B. 812 (1939) (advancements in stage of organi-
zation).
173. Bendix Products Corp., 15 N. L. R. B. 965 (1939). The original unit designa-
tion adhered to ran counter to the Globe doctrine. Cf. American Can Co., 13 N. L. R. B.
1252 (1939).
174. § 10(a), 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 160(a) (Supp. 1939). See (1939)
53 Haav. L. Rav. 301, (1938) 32 IL. L. REv. 353.
175. People ex rel. Warren v. Carter, 119 N. Y. 557, 23 N. E. 926 (1890). But cl.
State ex rel. Matson v. O'Hern, 104 Mont. 126, 65 P. (2d) 619 (1937).
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equitable adjudication of the validity of a collective bargaining contract. 170
In addition to arguing that the action of no other tribunal can oust its exclu-
sive jurisdiction, the Board has pointed out that there is complete failure
of identity of both parties and issues between judicial and Labor Board
proceedings. 177 The only effect accorded a judicial declaration that a labor
contract was valid has been to relieve the employer from back pay obliga-
tions for the period during which the declaration remained uncontradicted
by the Board.178 That this practice of the Board receives judicial sanction
was indicated by the decision in the M. & M. Woodworking Co. case,170 in
which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, although faced with the Board's
refusal to follow a finding in a prior injunction decree,180 refrained from
criticizing this action.
Labor Board orders impose no legal obligation on an employer until
accorded enforcement by a circuit court of appeals.28' The problem of col-
lateral attack, accordingly, can not arise -.182 The weight which will be given
to Labor Board determinations in private actions, however, is an important,
albeit an open, question. Despite the impotence of a naked Board order, a
state court has announced that the Board's finding as to illegal discharge and
employment status would be controlling in private litigation.lsa This attitude
seems amply justified by the fact that the Board has exclusive statutory juris-
diction over such issues. But whatever the status of a Labor Board order
growing out of complaint proceedings, it seems a certification order is of far
less dignity. Theoretically it is no more than an inconclusive statement of the
results of an investigation, 8 4 and has been authoritatively said in no way
to affect private rights and duties under the Labor Act.180 But a federal
court has held a Labor Board certification conclusive on the issue of repre-
176. Mason Mfg. Co., 15 N. L. R. B. 295 (1939) (suit to enjoin picketing) ; National
Elect. Prod. Co., 3 N. L. R. B. 475 (1937) (suit for specific performance of closed shop
contract).
177. South Atlantic S. S. Co., 12 N. L. R. B. 1367 (1939).
178. Hill Bus Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 781 (1937).
179. . & Al. Woodworking Co. v. N. L. R. B., 101 F. (2d) 938 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939).
180. 3%. & M6. Woodworking Co., 6 N. L. R. B. 372 (1938).
181. § 10(e), 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 160(e) (Supp. 1939).
182. The problem, however, is likely to arise under the F. T. C. Act of 1933, 52 SrAT.
113, 114 (1938), 15 U. S. C. § 45(g) (h) (Supp. 1939), under which Commission orders
are final and enforceable unless appealed from within a specified period. The F. T. C. is
otherwise procedurally comparable to the N. L. R. B. See (1939) 39 CoL L. R.Lv. 259,
270, (1940) 34 ILL. L. Rgv. 626.
183. Coldiron v. Good Coal Co., 276 Ky. 833, 837, 125 S. AN. (2d) 757, 760 (1939).
But cf. Proper v. John Bene & Sons, 295 Fed. 729 (E. D. N. Y. 1923), holding an F. T.
C. order made under the original Commission procedure inconclusive in a later private
action.
184. See note 60 supra.
185. Fedders Mfg. Co., 7 N. L. R. B. 817 (1938); cf. American Fed. of Labor v.
N. L. R. B., 60 Sup. Ct 300 (U. S. 1940). But cf. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 15 N. L.
R. B. 515 (1939).
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sentation in a suit to enjoin picketing.'80 This conclusion, however, is not
likely to be followed, since it would leave an allegedly minority union legally
bound by a Board order from which it had no opportunity for judicial relief.'
8 7
While recognizing the doctrine that the acts of its officers can not estop
the Government in its enforcement of a statute,"" the Labor Board has
adhered to the position that the policies of the Act will be best effectuated
by refusal to go behind its subordinates' actions and representations on which
reliance has been placed.'8 9 A settlement agreement, for example, in which
an employer and a board agent participate, 10 and which is duly observed by
the employer,' 0 ' has been held effectively to compromise all unfair practices
up to the date of settlement. 92 This position has been adhered to even where
the Board agent clearly erred in interpreting the Labor Act.1 3 The SEC,
on the contrary, has declined to be bound by an issuer's reliance on the
erroneous advice of a subordinate, and has been sustained in this position
by the courts.0 4 It is probable that the Labor Board's more precarious
political position, and its greater need for securing the cooperative confidence
of the group which it regulates, accounts for this difference in practice.
RAILROAD COMMISSIONS
The ICC, from its earliest decisions, has vigorously asserted the freedom
of its reparations orders from the technical legal rules of res judicata and
stare decisis.195 This position, grounded on the Commission's statutory
186. Oberman Co. v. United Garment Workers of America, 21 F. Supp. 20 (W. D.
Mo. 1937). A state labor board, on the contrary, has declined to accept as conclusive
the N. L. R. B.'s determination of the nature of the commerce in which an employer was
engaged. In re Union Premier Food Stores, 5 LMa. REL. REP. 299 (Pa. L. R. B. 1939).
187. American Fed. of Labor v. N. L. R. B., 60 Sup. Ct. 300 (U. S. 1940).
188. See cases cited notes 227 and 228 infra.
189. Shenandoah-Dives Mining Co. v. International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter
Workers, 11 N. L. R. B. 885 (1935) (unfair practice charges); Willys Overland Motors,
Inc., 15 N. L. R. B. 864 (1939) (bargaining unit determination).
190. The Board does not deem itself bound by a settlement in which its agents did
not participate. Horace G. Prettyman, 12 N. L. R. B. 640 (1939).
191. A settlement agreement which is not observed by an employer does not, of course,
control the Board. Halff Mfg. Co., 16 N. L. R. B. No. 68 (1939); United Carbon Co.,
7 N. L. R. B. 598 (1938) (consent election).
192. Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 12 N. L. R. B. 568 (1939). Events which occurred be-
fore a settlement, however, may be considered as evidence giving color to acts subsequent
to the settlement. Allsteel Products Mfg. Co., 16 N. L. R. B. No. 12 (1939).
193. American-Hawaiian S. S. Co., 6 N. L. R. B. 678 (1938).
194. S. E. C. v. Torr, 22 F. Supp. 602 (S. D. N. Y. 1938). Where the issuer had
ceased the practices he had been advised were legal, however, no injunction was granted.
S. E. C. v. Torr, 87 F. (2d) 446 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
195. Waco Freight Bureau v. Houston & T. C. R. R., 19 I. C. C. 22 (1910); Froc-
ber-Norfleet, Inc. v. Southern Ry., 190 I. C. C. 364 (1932); see Comment (1936) 34
Micn. L. REv. 672. The Commission's rules establishing a time limit for a reopening may




authority to modify any of its orders at any time, has been sustained by the
federal courts.190 This point of view is eminently fair, for a contrary rule
would lead to unjust inequalities of transportation costs among shippers in
identical positions. 197 On the other hand, the Commission has found it politic
to adhere to a previous conclusion unless, at the second hearing, new facts
are adduced, a showing of materially changed conditions is made or it is
manifest that the Commission had previously acted under a misapprehen-
sion. 9 8 An award may thus be based solely on the record in a previous
case.
199
The preceding paragraph has application only to situations in which the
initial reparations order followed the shipments for which reparations were
sought. Where the shipments in question moved subsequent to a commission
order involving the rate charged, a different set of rules may govern. The
Arizona Grocers case enunciated the doctrine that where the rate charged
had been set by the Commission itself, the Commission was devoid of power
to order reparations. 200 Three grounds were advanced for the decision: the
commission could not ignore its prior determination of reasonableness; reliance
by the carrier on the rate set should be protected; and the ascertainment of
a rate was a quasi-legislative act which, having the effect of a statute, con-
trolled the quasi-judicial act of awarding reparations. The decision, however,
left several questions open. Although it held that no new evidence could be
considered on the question of reasonableness, it did not touch on the problem
presented by a radical change of conditions between the date the rate was
set and the date of the shipments for which reparations were sought. - 3'
Again, although the opinion stated that commission approval of a rate set
by the carrier would have an equally binding effect, there was no indication
of the form such approval must take. There is some indication in the cases
following-the Arizona Grocers decision that the approval of rates implicit
196. Froeber-Norfleet v. Southern Ry., 9 F. Supp. 409 (N. D. Ga. 1934).
197. Ibid. Comparison may be made to the similar problems arising under the fed-
eral tax statutes. See note 129 supra.
198. Traugott Schmidt & Sons v. Michigan C. R. R., 23 I. C. C. 694 (1912) ; Traflic
Bureau of Nashville v. Louisville & N. R. R., 43 I. C. C. 366 (1917).
199. Pacific Mutual Door Co. v. Anm Arbor R. R., 101 I. C. C. 633 (1925).
200. Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 234 U. S. 370 (1932), (1932)
41 YALE L. J. 625. This rule, however, has no constitutional basis. Great Northern Ry.
v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U. S. 358 (1932). It is immaterial that a shipper sec:-
ing reparations was not a party to the rate proceeding. Arizona Wholemle Groery Co.
v. Southern Pac. Co., 68 F. (2d) 601 (C. C. A. 9th, 1934).
201. In Arizona Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 6S F. (2d) 601 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1934), no consideration xas given to a possible change in conditions although
the reparations claim was made eight years after the initial rate proceeding had been
held. But cf. Pitzer Transfer Corp. v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 10 F. Supp. 436 (D. 11d.
1935). But there is agreement that a commission-made rate which has been raised under
a blanket increase will not be conclusive. Texas & P. Ry. v. Louisiana Oil Ref. Corp.,
76 F. (2d) 465 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935), cert. denicd, 295 U. S. 767 (1935).
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in any denial of reparations will be sufficient to conclude the commission.
In the Second Arizona and El Paso cases,202 the complaint in the earlier
commission proceeding had attacked the existing rates as unreasonable and
demanded reparations, but the Commission had found that the record com-
piled did not support a finding of unreasonableness. Yet this finding was
held a sufficient affirmative approval to bring into play the Arizolan Grocers
rule. Other decisions, on the contrary, have emphasized the distinction be-
tween rates initiated by the Commission and those initiated by the carrier,
and have held the Arizona Grocers doctrine applicable only to the former.20 3
The Second Arizona and El Paso cases represent an unfortunate extension
of the original holding which contemplated a rate made by the Commission
itself on what the Commission felt was an adequate record. In the Second
Arizona and El Paso situations, the original record had been compiled by the
parties alone,20 4 and the Commission had declined to take affirmative action
on inadequate information. Apart from any extension of the rule, the Ari-
zona Grocers doctrine itself is open to severe criticism. It destroys the flexi-
bility of the ICC's system, under which the reasonableness of rates was
subject to the practical test of experience. 20 5 Moreover, if no leeway is to be
allowed for changes in conditions, the rule necessitates a constant reexamina-
tion of rates, a process in which the carrier will ordinarily have a significant
advantage over the shipper by virtue of its superior knowledge of fluctuating
transportation costs. Finally, the statute explicitly contemplates an imbalance
of remedies in favor of the shipper by allowing him to recover reparations
without affording corresponding relief to the carrier.20 0 These factors are
not offset by considerations of protecting reliance. There is nothing to indi-
cate that a railroad, in determining dividend payments, extension of service
or capital investment, relies more on Commission-made rates than on self-
initiated rates.
The numerous decisions relating to the problem under state railroad regu-
lation schemes are in almost unanimous accord with the result in the Arizonla
Grocers case. Inasmuch as these cases are based on divergent statutory pro-
visions, however, most of them cannot be regarded as exact equivalents of
the Arizona Grocers decision. In some instances, the statutory system makes
202. Arizona Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 68 F. (2d) 601 (C. C. A.
9th, 1934) El Paso & S. W. R. R. v. Phelps-Dodge Merc. Co., 75 F. (2d) 873 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1935). Neither decision regarded as significant whether this "affirmative approv-
al" followed a request that a rate be set for the future or merely a request for repara-
tions.
203. Jones v. Alton & S. R. R., 6 F. Supp. 807 (E. D. Ill. 1934); Pitzer Transfer
Corp. v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 10 F. Supp. 436 (D. Md. 1935).
204. This is the case in most reparations and rate proceedings. See 4 SIIARFMAN,
THE INTERSTATE COMERCE CoMMIssION (1937) 198. The Commission, however, reserves
the right to obtain additional evidence. Ibid.
205. See concurring opinion in Eagle Cotton Co. v. Southern Ry., 51 F. (2d) 443,
445, cert. denied, 284 U. S. 675 (1931).
206. 24 STAT. 383 (1887), 49 U. S. C. § 13(1) (1934).
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no provision for reparations and actions, either in court or before the state
commission, for refund of allegedly excessive charges have been held bad as
a collateral attack on the established rates.20 7 In other instances, reparations
are authorized for charges in excess of the established rates, and specifica-
tion of this ground has been held implicitly to exclude the power to award
reparations for unreasonable rates.208 Further, although commissions, as a
practical matter, give only routine approval to submitted tariffs, the fiction
has been indulged that all rates are commission made.20 Consequently, the
rates have been regarded as proof against retroactive change, on the theory
either that they were res judicata or that they had the effect of legislation.210
Where the statute authorizes reparations for unreasonable rates, approximat-
ing the situation under the federal act, the courts have divided. 2"1
Under all statutes, state courts have made much of the fact that the carrier
was legally obligated to charge the published rate, arguing that it would be
unjust to penalize the carrier for so doing. -212 Again, it has been claimed that
permitting the award of reparations means discrimination in favor of the
shippers who get them, and even among such shippers where numerous state
courts would be handling the individual reparations claims.213 The funda-
mental legislative purpose, it has further been urged, is to secure fixed rates
which will enable both shipper and carrier to do business on a basis of cer-
tainty.214 It has been conceded, however, that railroad commissions do not
and cannot investigate every rate in every tariff filed for its approval, and
that the prevailing rule requires constant rate revision to do justice to all
207. E. L. Young Heading Co. v. Payne, 127 Miss. 43, 89 So. 782 (1921) (court
suit) ; Great Western Portland Cement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 121 Kan. 531, 247 Pac.
881 (1926) (commission proceeding).
208. Montana Horse Products Co. v. Great Northern Ry., 91 Mont. 194, 7 Pac. (2d)
919 (1932) (court action); Te-xas & P. Ry. v. Railroad Comm., 137 La. 1059, 69 So.
837 (1915) (commission proceeding).
209. Missouri-K. & T. Ry. v. Railroad Comm., 3 S. W. (2d) 49 (Tex. Civ. App.
1928), aff'd, Producers Ref. Co. v. Missouri-K. & T. Ry., 13 S. W. (2d) 679, 6E0 (Te:.
Comm. App. 1930); Mathieson Alkali Works v. Norfolk & IV. Ry., 147 Va. 426, 137
S. E. 608 (1927).
210. Producers Ref. Co. v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 13 S. V. (2d) 679 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1930) (res judicata) ; Montana Horse Products Co. v. Great N. Ry., 91 Mont. 194,
7 P. (2d) 919 (1932) (effect of legislation).
211. Northern P. Ry. v. Dep't of Pub. Works, 136 Wash. 389, 240 Pac. 362 (1925)
(reparations order may not be inconsistent ith previously established rate). Contra:
Bonfils v. Public Util. Comm., 67 Colo. 563, 189 Pac. 775 (1920).
212. St. Louis-S. F. Ry. v. State, 155 Okla. 236, 8 Pac. (2d) 744 (1932) ; Northern P.
Ry. v. Dep't of Pub. Works, 136 Wash. 3S9, 240 Pac. 362 (1925). Contra: Bonfils v.
Public Util. Comm., 67 Colo. 563, 1S9 Pac. 775 (1920).
213. Jeremy Fuel & Grain Co. v. Public Util. Comm., 63 Utah 392, 226 Pac. 455
(1924); Montana Horse Products Co. v. Great N. Ry., 91 Mont. 194, 7 P. (2d) 919
(1932).
214. T. R. Miller Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 207 Ala. 253, 92 So. 797 (1922); E.
L. Young Heading Co. v. Payne, 127 Miss. 48, 89 So. 782 (1921).
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interests.2 15 But here again the preponderance of judicial opinion is that
stability of administrative action is preferable to flexibility and accuracy.
Contrary to this rule of conclusiveness, courts, anxious to protect railroads
from confiscatory rate regulation, have erected the rule that valuation and
other preliminary orders of railroad commissions are not res judicata.2 10 The
theory seems to be that since the preliminary order may not be reviewed on
the constitutional issue of confiscation, it is not conclusive of that issue when
it is later raised.2 17 ICC valuation orders, it may be noted, have been declared
by statute to be only prima facie evidence in succeeding rate proceedings.218
But the effect of other ICC preliminary orders and determinations of status
is far from clear. Originally, all such orders had neither of the logically
connected attributes of reviewability and conclusiveness.2 1 0 But the Rochester
case declared that most of the hitherto urireviewable orders would thence-
forth be reviewable. 220 And Shields v. Utah Idaho Central R. R. held that
even those ICC orders not directly reviewable would be deemed binding.2 21
Probably, then, the principle of res judicata will be applied to all such
determinations.
ADmINISTRATIVE RULINGS AND REGULATIONS
The Arizona Grocers case and the other retroactive rate change cases, as
contrasted with most of the other res judicata problems so far discussed, raise
the cognate problem of the protection which will be given private action which
follows and is based upon pronouncements of government officials or agencies.
Section 19a of the Securities Act of 1933 provides that there shall be no lia-
bility for compliance in good faith with any rule or regulation of the SEC,
even though that rule is later abrogated or judicially invalidated. This prin-
ciple, however, apparently extending to both private suits and criminal prose-
cutions, is relatively new to the law.222 It appears to be settled that, although
215. See cases cited note 209 supra.
216. New York C. R. R. v. New York & Pa. Co., 271 U. S. 124 (1926); New York
Tel. Co. v. Maltbie, 291 U. S. 645 (1934); see Sholley, Washington Public Utility Legls-
lation of 1933: Budget Orders as Res .udicata (1935) 10 WASH. L. REv. 1.
217. Van Wert Gaslight Co. v. Public Util. Comm., 299 Fed. 670 (S. D. Ohio 1924).
On the other hand, it has been argued that because preliminary orders are not res judi-
cata, they can not be confiscatory. State Corp. Comm. v. Wichita Gas Co., 290 U. S.
561 (1934).
218. United States v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. R., 273 U. S. 299 (1927).
219. United States v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 226 (1938) ; Compare Piedmont & N. Ry. v.
United States, 280 U. S. 469 (1930) with Piedmont & N. Ry. v. I. C. C., 286 U. S. 299
(1932).
220. Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125 (1939), (1939) 48 YALE
L. J. 1257, 53 HARV. L. Rv. 98.
221. 305 U. S. 177 (1938).
222. It has deservedly received wide acclaim from commentators. See Cook, Certainty
in the Construction of the Law (1935) 21 A. B. A. J. 19; Oliphant, Declaratory Rulings
(1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 7 (1938) ; Comment (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1076, 1078.
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compliance with a valid regulation will fully discharge any related statutory
duty, it will constitute no defense to an allegation of common law negli-
gence.2- 3 It has been further held that failure to take out workmen's com-
pensation coverage would not be excused despite the employer's reliance on
a departmental ruling that he wvas outside the statute. -2 4 Finally, there have
been numerous decisions that a ruling of the Comptroller of the Currency
permitting national banks to pledge their assets to secure private deposits was
not binding on other bank creditors even though the ruling had been relied
on by bank and "secured" depositors alike.
2 20
With respect to the effect of reliance in criminal actions, in only one dis-
covered case has a court, aside from statute, excused a statutory violation
committed in reliance on an interpretation of a responsible officer.22 0 The
circumstances, it was said, negatived criminal intent. Contrary decisions adopt
the rule that intention to commit the act in question is sufficient.2- '- Cases in
which conduct in violation of law has been enjoined22 are easier to justify
since they merely end unwittingly illegal activity without penalizing it.
A respectable number of cases have dealt with the effect of reliance on an
administrative pronouncement in a later civil controversy witl the Govern-
ment in which the Government agency adopts a position at variance with its
former declaration.22 9 In the recent Rcynlds Tobacco case, invoking the
federal income tax, the Supreme Court held that a treasury regulation which
had remained unchanged through several statutory reenactments could not
be retroactively amended to the prejudice of a taxpayer who had acted under
223. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Scarlett, 300 U. S. 471 (1937); Franldin v. Nowak,
53 Ohio App. 44, 4 N. E. (2d) 232 (1935). But cf. La Bourgoyne, 210 U. S. 95 (1903).
224. Long v. Thompson, 177 Wash. 296, 31 P. (2d) 908 (1934), (1934) 9 V.%sn. L
Rnv. 167.
225. Fort Worth v. McCamey, 93 F. (2d) 964 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938) ; Leonard v. Gage,
94 F. (2d) 19 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938), cert. denied, 303 U. S. 653 (1938).
226. People v. Ferguson, 134 Cal. App. 41, 24 P. (2d) 965 (1933); (1934) 22 CM..
L. REv. 569.
227. Hamilton v. People, 57 Barb. 625 (N. Y. 1870); State v. Foster, M2 r 1. 163,
46 At]. 833 (1900). The same has been held with respect to a federal tax penalty in-
curred in reliance on official advice. Searles Real Est. Trust, 25 B. T. A. 1115 (1932).
And reliance on the acts of government officers will not defeat an antitrust prosecution.
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., N. Y. Times, May 7, 1940, p. 1, col. 4; (1940)
49 YALE L. J. 761, 767.
228. Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 389 (1917); Securities
& Exch. Comm. v. Torr, 22 F. Supp. 602 (S. D. N. Y. 1933).
229. Although the doctrine has been stated in Duval v. United States, 25 Ct. Cl. 46
(1,89) that the government is immune to'equitable estoppel, the exceptions are far from
infrequent. Walker v. United States, 139 Fed. 409 (C. C. M. D. Ala. 1905), aff'd, 143
Fed. 1022 (C. C. A. 5th, 1906) (government acting in sovereign capacity); Denver &
R. G. R. R. v. United States, 53 Ct. Cl. 155 (1918) (government engaging in business
activity).
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the original regulation.23 0 The decision laid chief emphasis on the fact of
the reenactments. There is some authority, however, for the proposition that,
even in the absence of reenactment, a valid regulation may not be retroactively
modified.231 On the other hand, a dearly erroneous regulation is deemed a
nullity and reliance upon it affords no protection against a claim by the Gov-
ernment under a subsequent and correct regulation.2
3 2
CONCLUSION
Observable throughout has been the judicial tendency to assimilate admin-
istrative agencies to the corpus of judicial tradition. Courts -remote from
the exigencies of practical administration -- have inclined to a doctrinaire,
rather than a desirably pragmatic, approach in their frequent importation of
res judicata principles into the administrative process. With respect to col-
lateral attack, judicial imputation of conclusiveness is largely unexception-
able. Governmental efficiency imperatively demands that decisions for which
an adequate review is available be proof against collateral interference. It
is, on the other hand, far less important that they be given like effect in in-
dependent proceedings embracing a different subject matter. Yet, even here,
the application of res judicata rules to orders rendered after full hearing
seems not only devoid of prejudice to litigants, but a sizeable contribution to
the prestige and authority of non-judicial tribunals.
But the doctrinal utilization of res judicata to hold administrative agencies
without power to correct their own prior determinations frequently results
in the frustration of a manifest legislative desire to secure administration
free of legal strait-jackets. Where legislative policy remains unexpressed,
the desirability of permitting agencies to reverse their former action depends
principally on the nature of the substantive law administered and on the pro-
cedural character of original determinations. In this connection, neverthe-
less, a judicial policy of laissez-faire seems preferable. Administrative agen-
cies are by far the best qualified to develop their own res judicata practices
out of intimate acquaintance with their individual problems. Furthermore,
"interference by the courts is not conducive to the development of habits of
responsibility in administrative agencies.1233
230. Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U. S. 110 (1939) ; see Paul, Use
and Abuse of Tax Regulations in Statutory Construction (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 660;
(1939) 39 COL. L. REv. 716.
231. United States v. Alabama R. R., 142 U. S. 615 (1892) ; Stanolind Pipe Line Co.
v. Tax Comm., 30 F. Supp. 131 (W. D. Okla. 1939). But cf. Grand Trunk W. Ry. v.
United States, 252 U. S. 112 (1920).
232. Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Rev., 297 U. S.
129 (1936) ; Langstaff v. Lucas, 9 F. (2d) 691 (W. D. Ky. 1925), cert. denied, 273 U. S.
721 (1926).
233. F.C.C. v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 437, 443 (U. S. 1940).
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